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INTRODUCTION 
  
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is one of the Nation’s largest managers of 
infrastructure.  It is responsible for maintaining and operating the Nation’s navigable 
waterways and is the primary agency for maintaining federal flood control dams.  This 
includes a vast amount of infrastructure that includes roughly 270 navigation dams, 350 
reservoir dams, and 238 lock chambers (Bullock and Foltz 1995).  The navigable inland 
waterways carry roughly 17% of the Nation’s intercity cargo – an important economic 
role (USACE 2004).  Over half of the locks and dams are over 50 years old. The entire 
inventory is deteriorating over time and requires billions of dollars to upgrade, maintain, 
and repair.  The Corps of Engineers requires that a strength-based reliability analysis be 
completed to justify major rehabilitation projects. Reliability methods are preferred for 
cost-benefits analyses and for quantifying risk. More often, however, it is the general 
serviceability of a structure that dictates the requirements for maintenance and repair.   
The Corps of Engineers has developed a Condition Index (CI) rating system for a 
variety of structures that assesses the general serviceability condition of a structure based 
on periodic visual inspections.  A Condition Index (CI) is a rating between 0 and 100 that 
describes the condition of a structure at a point in time.  The CI is based on a series of 
observations by an inspector.  At the component level, the inspector classifies what he or 
she sees into the predefined descriptive category that best matches the observation.  Some 
CIs also include measurements. More often, the condition scores are based on descriptive 
word pictures that are often vague and difficult to quantify. Chouinard et.al. (2003) 
developed a deterministic CI rating system for spillway gate systems on dams.  The gate 
system contained 122 separate inspectable components, each with its own condition 
rating table.  The structure was decomposed into a seven-level structural hierarchy of 
systems, sub-systems, and components.  The highest levels are shown in Figure 1. 
Estes et.al. (2005) developed a reliability-based approach that assigns probabilistic CI 
ratings for groups of components, systems, and projects.  The approach accounts for the 
considerable uncertainty associated with the CI process which includes: 
• Uncertainty in the ability of different inspectors to reliably choose the correct 
condition state and to a greater degree, the appropriate score within a condition 
state 
• Uncertainty associated with the condition state tables where a single numerical 
score is obtained from matching an inspector observation to a word description of 
the distress. 
• Uncertainty in defining at which condition state a component will actually fail and 
needs to be replaced. 
• Uncertainty with how a component will deteriorate over time, although this 
uncertainty is gradually eliminated as inspections occur and the maintenance plan 
is updated. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY FOR THE SPILLWAY GATE SYSTEM FOR A DAM 
 
Estes et.al. (2005) makes some reasonable assumptions and addresses these 
uncertainties.  Using the condition index value as the random variable, the reliability 
index and probability of failure for a component at a point in time can be computed.  
With some further assumptions about deterioration, a time-dependent reliability analysis 
can be conducted using hazard functions to facilitate a probabilistic cost-benefit analysis.  
Estes et.al. (2005) illustrates these concepts using a both a simple hypothetical structure 
and the spillway gate system for the Great Falls dam.  
In the deterministic methodology, the higher level condition indices for sub-systems 
and systems (CI system) were computed as: 
 
           (1) IIII ++== ∑
            
AAj
j
j CCBB
n
System CICICICICI
=1
where CIj is the condition index of the subordinate component and Ij is the importance 
factor for that component relative to the rest of the system.  The composite rating was a 
weighted average of condition based on importance of the component.  The equation was 
used regardless of whether the components of the system were in series or parallel.  
When applying reliability-based methods to this system, there were two available 
approaches which produced dramatically different results.  The first was to use equation 
(1) for the mean value of the system CI and develop the corresponding standard 
deviation.  The second was a traditional reliability approach where the probability of 
failure of a series system with statistically indepent components can be computed as   
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where pf, series is the probability of failure of the series system and pfa is the probability of 
failure of one of the components that comprise the system. A series system is one where 
the system fails if any component in the system fails. Conversely, a parallel system is one 
where every component must fail before the system fails.  The probability of failure of a 
parallel system with independent components (pf, parallel) is similarly 
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This paper compares and contrasts these two approaches and recommends when each 
might be appropriate.  Examples from a dam spillway gate system are used to illustrate 
the differences in the two approaches. 
 
PARALLEL SYSTEMS 
 
Figure 2 shows a parallel power system consisting of medium voltage overhead lines and 
two back-up emergency generators.  The importance of the overhead wires is determined 
to be I=0.70 and each emergency generator has an importance of I = 0.15.  Note that 
within any system or subsystem the sum of the importance factors equals 1.0.  The 
importance factor is typically obtained using expert opinion and the weighting is usually 
a factor of cost, criticality, and function. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
A POWER SUB-SYSTEM FOR A DAM SPILLWAY CONSISTING OF OVERHEAD WIRES AND TWO BACK-UP 
GENERATORS.  THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS ARE IN PARALLEL AND HAVE ASSIGNED IMPORTANCE FACTORS 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the component condition tables for the overhead wires and 
emergency generators, respectively.  Based on inspection data, the overhead wires are 
considered in condition state 2 and for the two generators: one is in condition state 1 and 
the other is in condition state 2.   
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TABLE 1 
COMPONENT CONDITION TABLE FOR MEDIUM VOLTAGE OVERHEAD WIRES COMPONENT OF THE POWER 
SUB-SYSTEM FOR THE SPILLWAY GATE SYSTEM ON A DAM 
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FIGURE 3 
PROBABILISTIC CONDITION STATES AND FAILURE DEFINITION FOR THE MEDIUM VOLTAGE OVERHEAD 
LINES 
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TABLE 2 
COMPONENT CONDITION TABLE FOR EMERGENCY GENERATOR COMPONENT OF THE POWER SUB-SYSTEM 
FOR THE SPILLWAY GATE SYSTEM ON A DAM 
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FIGURE 4 
PROBABILISTIC CONDITION STATES AND FAILURE DEFINITION FOR THE EMERGENCY GENERATORS 
 
Regardless of the system reliability approach used, the reliabilities of the components 
are computed as specified in detail in Estes et.al. (2005).  Assuming that these are the 
first inspections for this condition state, the initial mean value for the condition index is 
the middle of the condition state.  As a component remains in a condition state, the mean 
value CI is assumed to deteriorate linearly over time. The range for the medium voltage 
overhead line condition state is 25-69 (Table 1), so the mean value is CI=47.  Assuming a 
5% inspector error, the probability of obtaining a value of CI<69 when the structure is 
actually in this condition state is 97.5%, or 0.975.  The standard deviation σ can be 
computed as: 
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where Φ is the standard normal variate whose value can be found in the standard normal 
distribution tables, and µ is the mean value of the condition state (Ang and Tang 1975). 
The distribution for CIOHLines is assumed to be normally distributed with parameters: 
N[47, 11.22].  Similarly, the distributions associated with the two generators are N[85, 
7.65] and N[32,11.22].  Based on the condition index definitions, failure is a normally 
distributed variable with the parameters N[25, 12.5].  The failure distribution would 
ideally be derived from a data base that reflects the historical condition index at time of 
replacement for similar components.  Expert opinion is used in the absence of data, until 
a sufficient database can be established. Figure 3 shows the probabilistic distributions of 
the condition states for the Medium Voltage Overhead Wires as well as the probabilistic 
distribution for failure.  Figure 4 shows these distributions for the Generators. 
The reliability index (β) for these components with respect to failure can be computed 
as: 
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The probability of failure (the probability that the component will be replaced) for 
each component is 
338.0662.01)42.0(1)42.0()(
)10(12.29999788.01)09.4(1)09.4()(
)10(51.99049.01)31.1(1)31.1()(
2#,
5
1#,
2
,
=−=Φ−=−Φ=−Φ=
=−=Φ−=−Φ=−Φ=
=−=Φ−=−Φ=−Φ=
−
−
β
β
β
Genf
Genf
OHLinesf
p
p
p
 (6) 
 
Weighted Average Reliability Approach 
 
Using the weighted average approach, the mean condition index for this system 
would be computed using Eq (1) 
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Because the equation is linear and the variables CIOH Lines, CIGen#1, and CIGen#2 are 
independent and normal variates, the standard deviation of the system CI, σCI system is 
(Ang and Tang 1975) 
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The value of the system condition index will always fall somewhere between the 
condition of the best and worst component.  The reliability index and probability of 
failure (replacement) of this system would be computed as: 
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In this case, the system index was 50.5 which is affected largely by the condition of 
the overhead lines. Suppose several similar systems were competing for the same scarce 
maintenance dollars.  Table 3 shows the results of three such structures where the 
condition ratings of the components have been reversed.  In case 2, the system index is 
raised to 71.4 because the condition of the overhead lines is rated so high.  Similarly, in 
case 3, the system index is only 42.2 despite both emergency generators being in the best 
condition of all three cases.  In this example, if these three systems were competing for a 
complete rehabilitation of the power system, the priority of funding would go towards 
case 3 followed by cases 1 and 2 in that order.  The large difference in importance factors 
makes the choice clearer.  Conversely, if the funding decision was only for replacement 
of generators, the priorities would have been different and case 2 would receive priority. 
  
Traditional Reliability Approach 
  
In the traditional reliability approach, the reliability of the system is at least as large 
as the reliability of its strongest member.   
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The system condition index can then be back calculated as: 
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The condition index is higher than the condition index of any individual component.  
Because all three of these components would have to fail for power to be denied to the 
system, there is little likelihood of occurrence. Table 3 illustrates that this condition index 
would apply to any of the cases described because traditional reliability does not account 
for the relative importance of a component to the overall system.  In a funding decision 
for system replacement, all three cases would receive the same priority and no distinction 
can be made between them. 
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COMPARISON OF RESULTS USING A WEIGHTED AVERAGE AND TRADITIONAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
APPROACH FOR A PARALLEL POWER SYSTEM ON A SPILLWAY GATE 
 
SERIES SYSTEMS 
  
Figure 1 shows the hierarchical structure of a typical spillway gate system on a dam.  
The gate system is divided into the Operations and Equipment portions of the dam. The 
Equipment which consists of the electrical system and the gate structure is given more 
importance that the Operations system which involves gathering information, making 
decisions and the actual access to the site and operation of the equipment.  Each of the 
sub-systems is further decomposed down to the component level.  Figure 5, for example, 
shows the Information Gathering sub-system that includes 19 inspectable components, 
each with its own component condition table.  
The condition index of each of these sub-systems is determined from the importance 
and condition of the components that comprise the sub-system.  In this case, the 
distributions of the sub-systems were determined to be: Information Gathering (IG), 
N[84,5]; Decision Making (DM), N[32,10]; and Access and Operations (A&O), 
N[47,15]. The reliability index (β) for these components with respect to failure can be 
computed as: 
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The probability of failure (the probability that the component will be replaced) for 
each component is 
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FIGURE 5 
THE GATHER INFORMATION SUB-SYSTEM FOR THE OPERATIONS SYSTEM (FIGURE 1) FOR THE SPILLWAY 
GATE SYSTEM ON A DAM 
 
Weighted Average Reliability Approach 
  
The Gathering Information, Decision Making, and Access/Operation sub-systems are 
a series system with respect to spillway gate Operations.  If any of those sub-systems fail, 
then the system will fail.  The decision making process is considered most important 
(I=0.55) and the access and operation is the least important (I=0.10).    Table 4 address 
three cases where the subsystems have various condition indices based on the inspection 
of subordinate components.  Looking at Case 1, the condition index of the Operations 
System is computed using Eq. (1) 
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Looking at the three cases, the priority of replacement funding would go to case 3 where 
the system condition index value is 45.5 based on the combined poor conditions of the 
Information Gathering and Decision Making sub-systems.  Even though the Decision 
Making sub-system is most important (I=0.55) and has the lowest individual score in case 
1, the relatively good condition of the Information Gathering portion (I=0.35) keeps it 
from receiving top priority.  The priority of replacement funding for these three systems 
would be case 3, case 1 and case 2 in that order. 
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TABLE 4 
COMPARISON OF RESULTS USING A WEIGHTED AVERAGE AND TRADITIONAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
APPROACH FOR A SERIES OPERATIONS SYSTEM ON A SPILLWAY GATE 
 
Traditional Reliability Approach 
  
In the traditional reliability approach, the reliability of the system is less than the 
reliability of its weakest member.  Using Eq. (2) the system failure probability is 
computed as: 
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The system condition index is computed as: 
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The condition index is lower than the condition index of any individual component.  
Because the Operations system would fail if any of the three sub-systems fail, the 
probability of failure is high and the condition index is extremely low.  The results will 
be the same for all three cases using this approach as no distinction is possible for 
component importance.  The funding priority would be high for all three cases. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
  
Two competing methods were introduced for analyzing the condition of a 
structural system.  The results produced by both were very different.  In the weighted 
average approach, the system condition index will always be somewhere between the 
condition of the best and worst component in the system.  In the traditional reliability 
approach, the condition index will always be lower than the condition of the worst 
member in a series system and higher than the condition of the best member in a parallel 
system. 
A traditional reliability approach works extremely well for a strength-based 
system where the importance factors of the components are relatively equal and the 
consequences of failure are typically catastrophic.  In a serviceability context where some 
failures are more serious than others and some components are clearly more important 
than others, the information provided is less useful. The extreme values obtained in the 
traditional approach exaggerate the condition of the structure.  A condition index of over 
100 for the parallel structure would probably ensure it does not get replaced until every 
portion of the system is significantly deteriorated.  In a multi-tiered series system, such as 
the spillway gate system presented here, the condition index would be so low that it 
would appear that every structure was in dire need of replacement.  The condition of the 
worst element in the system, no matter how minor, controls the maintenance decision. 
If the goal is to use the overall condition of a structure to prioritize and optimize 
maintenance funding, the weighted average approach seems to provide better decision 
making information.  By combining the condition of components with their importance to 
the overall system, it is easier to make a distinction between competing priorities. While 
series and parallel systems are treated in the same manner, a distinction could be made in 
the assignment of importance factors where a redundant system might receive a lower 
importance factor. 
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